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DUANE CHAPMAN and NEHA KHANNA'
 
ABSTRACT
 
Can the economic theory ofdepletion be reconciled with low petroleum prices? This paper 
uses a revision ofthe theory, which reflects demand functions that rise in response to increasing 
world population and income. The magnitude ofproducers' and consumers' surplus is estimated 
under both competitive and monopolistic assumptions; the result indicates a present value 
comparable to or in excess oftoday's Gross World Economic Product. 
Game theory' suggests a framework which explains the interaction between oil pricing and 
military polic.v, and the economic incentives which result in a general pattern ofrecelll market 
equilibrium crude oil prices often fluctuating within a $15-$20 per barrel range. The analysis 
concludes that the economic incentives for political instabilit,v in the Persian Gulfwill increase, and 
more formal methods ofsetTing the international framework for Persian Gulfoil may be expected. 
I. ECONOMIC THEORY AND DEPLETION 
The theory of depletion is generally excluded from applied analyses of petroleum 
geopolitics. Generally, the theory is perceived as being counter-factual in several important ways. 
As usually discussed, the theory assumes constant price or constant demand functions, and projects 
monotonically declining output and rising prices. These predictions for price and quantity arise 
from both monopolistic and competitive versions of the theory. 
However, the theory can be extended to reflect upwardly shifting demand functions rising in 
response to growing income and population, and constant, increasing, or declining extraction cost. ­
With these two extensions, depletion theory projects market equilibria where output rises, peaks, 
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and then declines. The price trajectory may decline, stay constant, or rise with the latter part of the 
path always increasing. With these modifications, the theory can be used to calculate the 
magnitudes of producer and consumer surplus which may arise from future use of world oil 
resources. 
First, consider Equation (1). It separates the competitive equilibrium trajectory for 
production and use into two components: 
(1) QE(t) QC(t) - ert * SF 
Here, t is the time subscript, QE is the market equilibrium quantity of production and consumption, 
QC is the quantity which would have been demanded in a competitive market without resource 
limitations, r is the real discount rate, and SF is a scarcity factor reflecting the amount by which 
unconstrained production exceeds remaining stock (see Appendix for details). 
The associated price path is in Equation (2). MC is marginal cost, P is price, SF is the 
scarcity factor again, and B1 is a coefficient. 
(2) P(t) MC(t) + en * SF * B1 
Equations (1) and (2) simplify the results of an optimal control solution to the problem of 
finding maximum producer and consumer surplus in competitive and monopolistic markets where 
demand curves shift upward as population and incomes rise, and remaining petroleum stock is 
finite. In addition, the marginal extraction cost may change over time in response to technological 
or environmental conditions, but remains unaffected by the declining stock ofremaining resources. 
The full problem and solution is summarized in the Appendix!, showing the basis for these ­
Equations. 
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Note that in Equation (1) the equilibrium quantity QE would equal the market solution QC if 
there were no resource limitation, making the scarcity factor SF equal zero. Similarly, in Equation 
(2), price equals marginal cost if there is no scarcity. Furthermore, if in the presence of scarcity, the 
marginal cost of extraction were declining over time, the optimal price trajectory may initially 
decline before ultimately rising. 
Figures 1 and 2 show stages of the solution. Figure 1 represents market equilibria with 
shifting demand and supply functions, and no resource limitation. This trajectory is also shown in 
Figure 2, as the sequence of triangles. However, with an effective resource constraint, the lower 
curve shows actual equilibria reflecting scarcity. Note that, even with scarcity, consumption 
increases for many years. 
II. PERSIAN GULF COSTS AND PRODUCERS' SURPLUS 
In estimating crude oil production costs, petroleum economics has developed its own 
applied version of discounting. In a simple form, it is: 
Adjusted Total interest +	 risk + depletion)(3)	 Investment = Initial * ( rate factor rate 
in Development Investment 
Using Adelman's work, the development 90st in the Persian Gulf is 55 cents per barrel 
(Chapman, 1999 and Adelman, 1993). This follows from assumptions of $2.50 per barrel initial 
investment for exploration, testing, and production equipment, and 10%, 10%, and 2% for the three 
rates. The result (55¢) is used in Equation (4): 
-
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IIIustrative Investment 
Crude Oil = In + Operations, + Shipping 
(4) Cost for Development Lifting 
Saudi Arabia 
$2.30Ibarrel = $0.55 + $0.25 + $1.50 
Although this outline of costing will seem simplistic to petroleum engineers, it captures the 
essence of the method. Generally, the same cost would be expected to produce and deliver Saudi 
crude oil to Europe, Japan, or the U.S. 
The comparable figure for the North Sea or Alaskan oil fields is on the order of$15 per 
barrel. l This is because geography and climate impose higher technological requirements with 
higher costs. If we consider geographic and cost data together, it appears that oil production has 
increased in the regions with higher cost and lower reserves. Simultaneously, production has fallen 
in the Persian Gulf where reserves are high and costs are low. 
Persian Gulf oil is not merely the lowest cost region. It is the region with the greatest 
remaining reserves, as shown in Table 1. Note the limited resources in the United States and in the 
North Sea. At some future period, as Alaska and the North Sea begin to decline, OPEC producers 
may be able to re-establish the price and quantity cartel that existed briefly in earlier periods. 
Through the application of Equations (1) and (2), illustrative estimates of the magnitude of 
producers' and consumers' surplus can be made (see the Appendix). These are shown in Table 2. 
The first column defines each of the 5 cases. The second column shows the optimal years of use of 
crude oil into the future for each case. The third column (lambda) is the shadow price, the value in 
the present of adding an additional barrel to world resources. 
-The last two columns are the most important. NPV is the net present value of producers' 
... 
surplus. It is economic rent, the profit above cost, where cost includes a return to investment and to 
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risk as described above. SW is the present value of social welfare, the sum of producers' and 
consumers'surplus. Consumers' surplus (not shown separately) is the difference between the fourth 
and the fifth columns. [Social welfare, the sum of producers' and consumers' surplus, is calculated 
with Appendix Equation (A 1). Producers' surplus is calculated with Equation (A2). Consumers' 
surplus is the difference between SW and NPV. For monopoly cases, the superscript is "m" rather 
than "c," and the Equation (AlO) for monopoly quantity is used in Equations (AI) and (A2).] 
Social welfare and consumers' surplus are both maximized by the competitive case. Net 
present value/economic rent is maximized by the monopoly case. Case 3 assumes a competitive 
market exists for 40 years, until world use peaks. Then, in the 41 st year, monopoly replaces 
competition. 
The 4th and 5th cases in the Table are "backstop" cases. They assume that new fuel 
feedstock such as biomass or coal-based liquids can become widely available at an equivalent cost 
of S50 per barrel. (This implies $2 per gallon gasoline: $0.80 per gallon for refining and 
distribution, and $1.20 per gallon for the $50 per barrel crude feedstock. There are 42 gallons per 
barrel.) 
Since Persian Gulf costs are so much lower than in other producing regions, much of the 
economic rent in the 4th column goes to those producers. Note that the difference between 
competition and monopoly (cases #1 and #2) is $6 trillion as a present value. Converted to future 
value at 5% interest at the end of production (92 years), that value would be $534 trillion. 
Regardless of the time perspective, there is considerable economic motivation to control Persian 
Gulf oil production. 
-
..­
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III. IS A GAME THEORY EQUILIBRIUM STABLE?
 
In the early period of the Persian Gulf oil crisis, then-president Bush and Secretary of State 
James Baker were very explicit about the economic motivations for reversing the Iraqi attempt to 
dominate the Persian Gulf. Table I indicates that Iraq sought control over 55 percent of proved 
reserves. This quotation was typical: "Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom 
of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's greatest reserves fell 
into the hands of Saddam Hussein." (New York Times, 1990 and Yergin, 1991, p. 773) 
Iraq was defeated (as it had been in Iran), and its world production in the 1990s is reduced to 
only 20% of its 1989 level. Nevertheless, there are important unresolved issues that need to be 
addressed. They include: 
•	 the political motivation on the part of low cost Persian Gulf producers to offer a price shelter for 
expensive Northern Hemisphere oil; 
•	 the powerful economic incentive for continuing instability; 
•	 the military cost to the U.S. of guaranteeing access to low cost Persian Gulf oil; and 
•	 the existence or potential for international mechanisms to address the incentives for seizure and 
the global problems of growing energy use. 
If Persian Gulf production costs are as low as the data suggest, why do the Persian Gulf 
producers not seek monopoly power by first driving high cost competitors out of the industry? 
Adelman's work leads him to conclude that $5 per barrel could have been an equilibrium 
competitive price in the 1980s and 1990s (Adelman 1986 and 1993, p. 25. Also see The Economist, 
1999, pp. 23-25, which also notes $5 as a possible purely competitive equilibrium price.). He had 
noted that this price would have been profitable for OPEC, and could have led to major increases in ­
OPEC production and world oil consumption. At the same time, a price of $1 0 or below would 
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reduce capacity in the U.S. and in the North Sea. 
It is this latter point which should be given considerable attention. If Saudi Arabia and 
Persian Gulf governments keep prices in the 515 to $20 range, they support high cost oil production 
in the countries which provide military security for Persian Gulf governments. 
This important point is emphasized by George Bush's meetings with Saudi government 
ministers and the King in 1986. Bush, then Vice President, publicly and privately sought Persian 
Gulf support for higher crude oil prices. The price at that time was below $10 (Yergin, 1991, pp. 
755-761. Yergin's commentary notes one OPEC oil minister discussing $5 as a possible market 
price: p. 759.). 
The economic logic is as follows. U.S. net imports of petroleum have reached one halfof 
total use. 3 The U.S. production is costly; production cost in the Persian Gulfis not. Consequently, 
low crude oil prices increase U.S. dependence on imports in two ways. High cost U.S. production 
has to be shut down when crude prices are near or below 510 on a long tenn basis. Second, U.S. 
consumption of oil increases with lower prices. The end result is that crude prices in the 515 to 520 
range avoid financial loss for American oil producers, slow the decline in U.S. production levels, 
and encourage U.S. political support for Persian Gulf governments threatened by Iraq or other 
forces seeking monopoly power over Persian Gulf oil. 
The result of those 1986 discussions was an agreement to set $15 to $18 as a world goal 
(Yergin, 1991, pp. 755-761). As already noted, that price level has endured. The Persian Gulf War 
added strength to the existing relationships. 
Consider Japan's position in supporting the military defense of Kuwait by the U.S.-led 
operation. Japan imports essentially all of its petroleum. Three-fourths of its crude oil has ­
originated in the Persian Gulf region (USEIA, 1992, p. 52). In the short run, it would benefit from a 
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$5 to 510 world price. But, if Persian Gulf oil drives out U.S. and North Sea producers, the 
resulting monopoly-influenced price would exceed the current 515 to 520 range. With a long run 
perspective, Japan can depend upon stable prices and political stability for its supply, both 
supported by the U.S. (Yergin, 1991, pp. 759-760). 
Table 3 lays out these and related points in a game theory framework. Both Persian Gulf 
and GEeD governments have been accustomed to the $15 to $20 stable price range. Either group, 
acting alone, could for a short period force prices in either direction from this range. However, at 
least for the near term into the next century, both groups have incentives to keep prices in their 
current range. This is similar to the game theory concept of Nash Equilibrium: a status quo where 
neither side can improve its overall situation by changing its strategy. A game theory approach, 
then, is intended to represent the interaction of politics, military defense, and economics in world oil 
markets. 
This S15 to $20 level is far below a true monopoly price. It is also far above a truly 
competitive world price. The outcome in one narrow facet resembles a competitive market: world 
price is about at the level where it equals the marginal cost of high cost producers. 
In 1998, cash prices for Persian Gulf oil were in the $10 to 515 range. The primary cause 
may have been a cessation of accelerated growth in petroleum consumption in Asia. Throughout 
most of that year, futures prices remained in the $15 to $20 range. With this downward pressure of 
the 1998 cash prices, the 1999 response could be anticipated which would return these crude prices 
to the usual range. 
The second problem affecting the level and stability of prices and supply has already been 
-
noted: the Persian Gulfs holdings of extensive amounts oflow cost reserves constitute an incentive 
for continuing political instability. The magnitude of potential gain is evident from the analysis. 
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With a competitive world market, the economic rent accruing to the owners of the resource had a 
1996 present value on the order of fifteen to twenty trillion dollars (see Table 2 again). 
If a monopoly were unexpectedly to reassert control, the economic rent estimate would be 
higher, in the twenty to twenty five trillion dollars range. This petroleum rent, or profit above cost, 
is comparable in magnitude to the planet's total Gross Economic Product. [World gross economic 
product was S30 trillion in 1997 (World Bank, 1999).] 
On a short run basis, the annual Persian Gulf production is typically in the five billion barrel 
range in the 1990s. Recalling the discussion of Saudi Arabian crude oil costs, the rent, the 
difference between price and cost, is typically between Sl 0 and SIS per barrel. We can assert that, 
with the current market framework, Persian Gulf govcmrnents earn at least 550 billion annually in 
rent above cost. 
The tremendous magnitude of these amounts continues to offer incentives for groups outside 
the current framework to gain some part of this value through arms and political coercion. 
Consequently, continuing political instability is a possible result of the high levels of economic rent. 
This leads to the third issue: what is the military cost to the OECD countries of protecting 
the current market framework and continued access to the extensive Persian Gulfreserves? 
Economists generally do not consider this point to be relevant for calculations of external cost. One 
exception is the work of Darwin Hall. Hall's statistical analysis (19**) finds a relationship between 
oil imports and U.S. defense spending. Translated into simple terms, each barrel of imported oil 
adds $10 to defense expenditures. This outweighs a trend variable, which would be reducing 
military spending by $17 billion annually, in the hypothetical absence ofoil imports. Hall also 
-
concludes that the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve adds another $2 to Federal expenditures for 
each barrel of imported oil.4 
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During the Cold War era of competition between the Soviet Union and U.S. allies, there was 
considerable concern about Soviet influence acquiring a voice in Persian Gulf decision-making. In 
1920 and again in the 1940s during World War II, the Soviet Union actively supported short-lived 
soviet republics in Iran. In 1950, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency provided short-tenn 
leadership to the effort to change Iran's government. s The collapse of the Soviet Union ended this 
competition in the early 1990s. 
It must be noted that Hall's approach is not widely accepted amongst environmental 
economists. Outside the field of environmental economics, energy economists are somewhat more 
interested. But even among analysts concerned with petroleum and military/political security, there 
is reluctance to take Hall's literal dollars-and-cents approach. 6 
IV. CAN THE PRICE OF OIL BE PREDICTED? 
Economic theory suggested very neat possibilities for projecting future prices for finite 
resources. In contrast. the preceding discussion introduced the complex world of geopolitics, which 
created a decade-long era in which crude oil prices were generally in the $15 to $20 per barrel 
range. 
'Oil shocks' which create rapid price increases are dramatic, as occurred briefly in the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s. However, unexpected events can also reduce petroleum prices. One such 
surprise took place in 1998. Even though world oil consumption continued to increase, oil prices 
dropped sharply. Figure 3 helps explain this. [Of course, Figure 3 is not drawn to scale; it shows 
the economic logic of shifting demand and supply curves causing price reductions while 
-
consumption increases.] 
First, note that actual oil consumption increases from the first period to the second period: 
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Q2A is greater than QIA' (QIA is actual quantity in the first period, and QZA is actual quantity 
consumed in the second period.) 
But, actual prices have fallen sharply, and PZA is much lower than PIA in spite of the increase 
in world oil consumption. How does this happen? It was a result of surprising shifts in both 
demand and supply curves. The world oil industry had expected the global demand curve to 
continue to shift upward, to move from D1A (actual first period demand curve) to DZE (expected 
second period demand curve). Oil production capacity was adequate, and the graph shows the same 
supply curve for the first period, SC 1A, and the expected supply curve for the second period, SC2E . 
If everything had gone as expected, the expected second period price P2E would have been about the 
same, and the expected second period market equilibrium for quantity (Q2E) would have increased. 
Both are shown. 
However, there were two major surprises. First, the economic downturn in Asia in 1998 
made the actual global demand curve DZA much less than the expected DZE ' Second, Iraq nearly 
doubled its sales in 1998, so more oil was available. The actual global supply curve SC2A was 
greater than the expected SCZE ' 
The results? QZA increased from the previous year's actual QIA' and actual price dropped 
sharply from PIA to P2A . 
Suppose the low crude oil prices of 1998 were to continue. We know from the preceding 
analysis that there would be significant reductions in high cost U.S. oil production. There would be 
a restructuring of the U.S. oil industry as shut-down production required new corporate networks 
organized around increased use of low cost Persian Gulf oil. 
Alternatively, the strategic game theory equilibrium might return crude prices to the $15 to ­
... 
$20 range, as happened in April 1999 (New York Times, April 10, 1999). 
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It should not be supposed that there is sufficient infonnation here to make a precise forecast 
of the price of oil at some future date. We do know, however, that we have identified the factors 
which influence those future prices. 
Personally, we expect continued low crude oil and gasoline prices (in real dollars) in the 
early beginning of the 21st Century. Very much further into the future, we might see the emergence 
of continuously growing real prices for petroleum products and ultimately the emergence of new 
energy sources to substitute for today's petroleum technologies. 7 
V. POLICIES: MILITARY; TAXATION; ADMINISTRATION 
The long period of low gasoline and oil prices in association with growing world and U.S. 
consumption seem persuasive evidence for the absence of any economic problems associated with 
the concepts of scarcity or depletion. However, an application of economic theory (incorporating 
upwardly shifting demand functions) projects a long period of rising output and stable prices, 
followed by declining output and rising prices. 
Current cost of production and transport of Persian Gulf oil to Europe, Japan, and the U.S. is 
low, on the order of $2.50 per barrel. Comparable figures for the North Sea and Alaska are on the 
order of $15 per barrel. The geographic distribution of crude oil is such that current world 
production comes disproportionately from high cost, lower reserve regions. 
Economic theory related to competition and monopoly helps explain some dimensions of the 
policies of OPEC and OECD countries, but game theory helps incorporate the political factors 
which support a stable status quo in the near tenn. It is one possible description of current markets: 
the term reflects the interactions of economics, politics, and military considerations. 
Given the magnitude of economic rent and geological resources in the Persian Gulf region, 
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the incentives for the use of military force to gain or defend access will continue. As the region's 
share of remaining petroleum resources continues to rise, the potential for anned conflict will 
Increase. 
George Bush articulated a view that international military force is appropriate to defend this 
world resource against monopolistic control by aggressive invaders. However, the combination of 
the growing economic importance of Persian Gulfoil and the increasing importance of petroleum as 
a source of greenhouse gases will define a new challenge. At some future period, international 
taxation as well as military protection may be considered for application to Persian Gulf oil. 
One fonn of international administration already exists, the status quo. UN-authorized 
military forces were still in place in 1999. For Iraq, the Security Council continues to limit oil 
production and foreign trade. As a consequence of the war, U.S. military forces remain significant 
in several countries, and bombed Iraqi oil facilities in early 1999. Naval power in the Gulf 
continues as well. In the short run, this de facto international administration will continue. 
A second type of international administration is the managementof production and pricing 
goals by OPEC. OPEC itself is evolving into a broader organization with the inclusion nfMexico, 
Russia, and Norway into the production quota process. [Wall Street Journal, June 26,1998. The 
Saudi oil minister reaffinned the price range goals outlined here, and argues for a broader global 
organization to handle production planning.] This emerging producer organization may playa role 
in international policy. 
Taxation, particularly, may become relevant. The basis may be Persian Gulf exports, or 
international trade in crude, or world crude production. Consider for illustration a $5 per barrel tax. 
For Gulf producers with about $12.50 per barrel in economic rent above cost, the tax would transfer 
­
... 
40%. The revenue could be used to finance UN-authorized peacekeeping activities, or climate 
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change programs. The consumer impact would be an increase in gasoline prices of 12 cents per 
• 
gallon. 
Variations in the concept would include (a) initiating a very low tax, increasing it gradually, 
and (b) dividing tax revenue into shares for exporting governments, and international use. 
Looking into the future, several points are clear. 
In the next decade, North Sea and Alaskan production will peak and decline; 
•	 The Persian Gulf will increase its share ofremaining resources; 
•	 Prices and rents will begin to increase sometime in the first quarter of the 21 st Century; 
The economic incentive will increase for military seizures of Gulf oil regions by Iraqi-type 
military actions; 
•	 Nuclear and missile weapons testing will continue, both by one or more Gulf nations and their 
neighbors; 
•	 Global production and consumption will continue to rise in the near future before peaking; and 
•	 The Kyoto Protocol and future climate change treaties will develop economic incentives to 
influence levels of world oil consumption. 
Supporters of Morris Adelman's perspective will be comfortable with the emphasis here on 
low Persian Gulf production costs and the global importance of oil from that region. (They may be 
less comfortable with the reconciliation of depletion theory with the current era of low prices and 
growing consumption.) Nevertheless, we share this Adelman conclusion, "Trillions of petrodollars 
have changed the Middle East from a local hot spot to a world problem....The c..vcle will continue: 
meetings, quotas, firm prices, cheating, price declines, threats and promises, meetings, with here 
and there some drastic political-military moves." (Adelman, 1993, p. 29) ... 
International administration does exist today in a de facto form, with respect to U.N. and 
14 
U.S. military control, and OPEC output/price planning. The confluence of trends points towards 
continued concerns about stability, prices, and climate change. Perhaps the major issue raised here 
is the future evolution of current aspects of international management of crude oil in the Persian 
Gulf. 
-
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APPENDIX: A MODEL OF OPTIMAL RESOURCE DEPLETION FOR COMPETITIVE
 
AND MONOPOLISTIC MARKETS
 
This Appendix provides a summary of the model framework from which Equations (1) and 
(2) in the text are derived. These two equations are compact expressions of Equations (A7) and 
(A9) below. The values in Table 2 are calculated with the Appendix equations. The model's 
utilization of dynamic demand and cost functions with explicit solutions can be seen as an extension 
of the Hotelling (1931) model of exhaustible resources. The parametric assumptions employed in 
obtaining the results in Table 2 are shown in Table 4. 
Consider a perfectly competitive world oil market with a fixed stock, S, of remaining oil 
resources. Let Pt be the world oil price (per barrel) and C, be the marginal cost of oil extraction in 
period t, respectively. Suppose population, Nt' and per capita income, YP are both increasing 
steadily over time. This would imply that the (inverse) demand function would be shifting outward 
over time. For computational ease, we make the following two assumptions: (i) The inverse 
demand function is linearly related to world oil production, qt; and (ii) as a first approximation, the 
marginal cost of extraction changes over time in response to technological innovation and 
environmental protection. 
The world oil market may be represented as maximizing the present value of social welfare 
(SW), the sum of producers' and consumers' surplus, subject to the appropriate economic, 
demographic, technological, and geological constraints. Under our assumptions, this may be 
characterized as follows: 
-
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Maximize {qp T} SW = Tf[qf, ( 0 0 ~ )] - C( dq e- r ( dt 
S.t. 
T 
f q( dt 
a 
~,q/ 
< S 
~ 0, ~ - C( ~ 
° (AI) 
where ~ = p(qp N(, yJ 
= Cae¢!C(t) 
and 
13/ < 0 is the slope of the inverse demand function with respect to quantity; 
flc' > 0 defines the intercept of the inverse demand function; 
v/ > 0 is the elasticity of the inverse demand function intercept with respect to world 
population; it represents the responsiveness of oil price and quantity to N/; 
V2 > 0 is the elasticity of the inverse demand function intercept with respect to per capita 
income; it represents the responsiveness of oil price and quantity to y/; 
8/ > 0 is the population growth rate; 
~ > 0 is the growth rate of per capita income; 
¢ S 2 0 is the growth rate of the marginal cost of extraction; 
r > 0 is the discount rate; 
S> 0 represents remaining oil resources. 
Since under our assumption of perfect competition, social welfare maximization is ­
... 
equivalent to the maximization of the present value of profit (Chapman 1993), we may restate the 
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problem as follows: 
Maximize ¢,] c -rrdNPV= 
- fJIql ) - Coe ql e t{qt. T} 
s.t.	 XI = q, c
 
X o 0
 (A2) 
:::; SX r 
I 
where Xc, = Jq~dt 
0
 
f) = f)\ VI + f)']Y2
 
fJ2 = fJ; N~'I y~': 
Note in this non-stochastic optimal control problem, there are two control variables: q/, the quantity 
of oil produced at time t, and r', the terminal period of the planning horizon. (The superscript c 
denotes the optimal solution in a competitive market.) The state variable is cumulative production 
through period t, x,c. The Hamiltonian, ff, associated with the competitive oil market case is 
(A3)
- 0 
where A{ 2 0 is the costate variable. The first order conditions for the optimal solution are: 
-
... 
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oHc (. )(i) 
..., = 0 
cql 
oHC (ii) Al (. ) = o (i.e., Ii is constant)	 (A4) 
oXI 
• cHc (. )(iii)	 XI ql

cAl
 
Solving the first order conditions gives us the following: 
(AS)
 
When the constraint implied by the finite remaining stock of oil resources is non-binding, 
XT < Sand), = O. In this situation, throughout the period, 
(A6) 
I.e., the optimal production trajectory would be identical to that produced by a competitive oil 
market without any resource limitations. However, when the constraint is binding, ). >0 and 
Tfqldt = S. Under these conditions we obtain 
o 
~r) (fJ: - S); and 
(A7)
rl 
QCt - ;(r) (ft4c - S) 
T"	 ­
where fJ4c - JQC dt, i.e., the cumulative production through Y that would have occurred in a 
t 
o
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T" 
perfectly competitive market in the absence of a resource constraint, and M(r) = ferr dt IS an 
o 
accumulation factor. Note that (/3/ - S) represents the amount by which unconstrained production 
exceeds the remaining stock and thus represents scarcity. Therefore, the optimal oil production 
trajectory may be written as: 
q c = DC _ err SF (A8)I _ I 
!J.t - S 
where SF = M(r) is a scarcity factor. The corresponding optimal price trajectory is: 
(A9)
 
Following the logic of the above optimization, it can be shown that the solution to the optimal 
depletion problem in the case of an oil market characterized as a pure monopoly is: 
(AlO) 
The optimal value for T, T, may be obtained by substituting the expression for the optimal 
c'SW 
oil production trajectory in Equation (AI) and solving the condition = 0 . This results in 
or 
7"'" • = 0 if the resource constraint is binding {1;: qT 
1 - mm I (All)1;. : fJ2 eflT: = Coe¢T: if the resource constraint is non - binding 
Note, in the text, QE(t) refers to q(c and P(t) refers to PIc. For the numerical values shown in Table 2 
of the text, the parameter values in Table 4 were assumed. 
It is worth noting that Stiglitz (1976) showed that in the presence of constant elasticity ­
demand functions and zero extraction costs, the competitive and monopoly cases yield identical 
20 
price trajectories. However, if either one, or both, of these conditions are not met, the monopoly 
price is initially higher and the optimal production horizon is longer. Furthermore, Stiglitz argued 
that these two price paths diverge only slightly. This result was reexamined by Pindyck (1978) who 
showed that degree to which a monopolist is able to exercise his monopoly power depends on his 
ability to take advantage of the short term adjustment lags in the demand for output. This was 
specifically true in the case of OPEC. Our model is congruent in detail with both. 
-
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FOOTNOTES
 
* Duane Chapman (ldc2@comell.edu) is Professor of Environmental Economics, Cornell 
University, Ithaca, New York. Neha Khanna (nkhanna@binghamton.edu) is Assistant Professor of 
Economics and Environmental Studies, Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York. This 
paper was presented at WEAl's n'd Annual Conference, Lake Tahoe, June 28-July 2, 1998, in the 
session on conflict and resource scarcity organized by Jane Hall. The authors would like to 
acknowledge the editorial support of Susan Weitz. Constructive and interesting questions were 
raised by two anonymous referees. 
1. This paper is in part the basis for Chapter 9, "World Oil: A Strategic Limited Resource?" in 
Chapman (1999). Also see Chapman (1983). This second article was the basis for the Appendix, 
which describes the optimal control framework for Equations (1) and (2). Further discussion of the 
results is available in Rowse (1988 and 1990). 
2. Again as illustration, use Adelman's (1993) UK value of $14,400 per daily capacity. Now 
assume this includes exploration cost. For the 'oil discount factor,' use 10 percent interest, 10 
percent risk factor, and 5 percent decline. Assume $5 per barrel each for operations and delivery to 
a European port refinery. The result is $15 per barrel production cost for crude oil for the UK. 
3. There is some disagreement on the point as to whether import dependency should be 
measured by imports alone, or net imports defined as imports less exports. On the net import basis, 
the U.S. percentage is about 50 percent of the 6-7 billion barrels of annual consumption. Both U.S. 
annual consumption and the net import percentage are slowly increasing. The Persian Gulfhas 
supplied about 20 percent of imports over a quarter of a century. 
-

4. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is maintained at nearly 600 million barrels. Hall's 
25 
estimates were in 1985 dollars (Hall, 1992); the text values are in 1995 dollars. An analysis by 
Green and Leiby implies military cost at about $5 per imported barrel (see Kahn, 1998, p. 238). 
Michael O'Hanlon at the Brookings Institute estimates a very high Persian Gulf military cost for the 
United States: $50 billion annually. See New York Times, December 30, 1995, and September 18, 
1996. 
5. Kermit Roosevelt coordinated this effort. Roosevelt (1979) is very informative. A brief 
economic history of the Cold War in oil is in Chapman 1983, pp. 83-86. 
6. Some other sources on the economics of petroleum and national security are Adelman 
(1993, pp. 27-28), Bohi and Quandt (1984), Broadman and Hogan (1988), Lichtenblau (1994, pp. 
329-346), Lovins and Romm (1992/93), Ravenal (1984 and 1985). Shibley Telhami and Michael 
O'Hanlon attribute $50 billion annually to U.S. military spending related to the Persian Gulf (see 
New York Times, December 30,1995, and September 18,1996). 
7. New technologies may bring such sources as tar sands, oil shale, and coal liquefaction into 
commercial gasoline production. Much higher prices would bring these sources into production. 
Backstop technologies are part of the depletion theory used in this discussion; see Chapman (1993). 
-
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ABBREVIATIONS 
FSU Former Soviet Union 
GNP Gross national product 
na Not applicable 
NPY Net present value 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OPEC Organization of Oil Producing and Exporting Countries 
SW Social welfare 
U.N. United Nations 
U.S. United States 
JEL Classification Code 
C61, Q32, Q41, Q43, Q48 
-

27
 
TABLE 1
 
Geologists' Upper Probability Estimates of Regional and World Crude Oil
 
(billion barrels)
 
Identified Reserves Estimated 
Undiscovered 
Resources 
Estimated Total 
Upper Probability 
Remaining 
Resources 
Persian Gulf 660 217 877 
Former Soviet Union 57 234 291 
United States 23 55 78 
North Sea - Western 
Europe 
17 34 51 
World 1,000 938 1,938 
Note: On identified reserves: Iraq 100; Iran 89; Kuwait and Neutral Zone 99; Saudi Arabia 259. 
World totals include other regions. Total four countries: 547; or 55 percent. See U.S. Geological 
Survey and other sources discussed in Chapman (1993 and 1999). For 1995 production, the 
amounts were: Persian Gulf7; FSU 2.5; U.S. 2.5; North Sea-Western Europe 2; world total 22; all 
in billion barrels. Also see Campbell and Laherrere (1998, pp. 78-83). 
-
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TABLE 2 
Producers' Surplus and Social Welfare: Present Values 
T ),a NPVb SWc 
CASE (vears) ($/bn (in billion $) (in billion $) 
1. Competition 69.44 $7.46 $15,659 $31,561 
2. Monopoly 91.78 $4.02 $21,469 $27,980 
3. Shift from competition 80.80 na $16,153 $31,224 
to monopoly, year 41 
4. Competition 47.67 $2.63 $5,519 $29,365 
with backstop 
5. Monopoly with 55.20 na $14,876 $17,522 
backstop 
a. Lambda is the shadow price, the present value of an additional barrel of oil. 
b. NPV is the net present value of producers' surplus or rent. 
c. SW is social welfare, the present value of consumers' and producers' surplus. 
na = not applicable. 
Note: See Appendix for model structure and Table 4 for parameter values. 
-
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Price Per Barrel 
$10 or less 
$15-$20 
$30 
TABLE 3
 
General Economic Impact of Crude Oil Price Decision 
in Game Theory Framework 
OECD Countries 
-higher GNP growth 
-shut domestic production 
-greatly increased oil 
consumption 
-much more imports 
-more pollution, climate 
change 
-end Persian Gulf politi­
cal support 
-stable GNP growth 
-stable near-term oil 
production 
-slow growth in oil 
consumption 
-slow growth in import 
share 
-stable prices 
-continued Persian Gulf 
support 
-decline in GNP growth 
-rapid near-term growth 
in production 
-stable or declining 
consumption 
-end Persian Gulf 
support 
30
 
Persian Gulf Oil 
Producers 
-loss of OECD 
political support 
-lower revenue, 
greater volume 
-higher market 
share 
-faster depletion 
-continued OECD 
political support 
-stable revenue, 
profit, rent 
-loss ofOECD 
political support 
-less market share 
-less production, 
more profit, rent 
-greater payoff to 
successful Iraq­
type action 
-

TABLE 4
 
Parametric Assumptions
 
Parameter 
~\ 
~2 
• 
VI 
V2 
6\ 
60 
¢ 
Co 
No 
Yo 
r 
S 
Numerical Value Assumed 
1.8
 
60
 
1.0
 
0.5
 
1.37% per year
 
1.60% per year
 
1.61 % per year
 
SlOper barrel (1989 prices)
 
5.3 billion (in 1990)
 
$4000 (1989 prices)
 
5% per year
 
2100 billion barrels (upper 5% probability of estimated resources)
 
-
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Figure 2. World Petroleum Market Projections: Growing population, 
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Figure 3. Expectations and Market Equilibria 
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